

Dynamic Choice of Information Sources

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Why do we learn?

Why do we learn?

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
Physics is like sex: sure, it may give some practical results, but that's not why we do it.



Richard Feynman

Why do we learn?

I'm still waiting for the day that I will actually use



17. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} + \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} = 0$ 18. $3 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} + 5 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} + \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} = 0$
19. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} + 6 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} + 9 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} = 0$ 20. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} - \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} - 3 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} = 0$
21. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} = 0$ 22. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} - \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} + 2 \frac{\partial u}{\partial x} = 0$
23. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} + 2 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x \partial y} + \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial x} - 6 \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = 0$
24. $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2} = u$ 25. $a^2 \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} - \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial y^2}$
26. $k \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial t}$, $k > 0$

in real life


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
Motivation

We have common sense understanding that knowledge is important, it will pay off. But often in a distant future, and **right now we might not know where and how we are going to use this knowledge.**

How to choose what to learn if we don't know the goal?

Example


- ▶ A company has **two research divisions**
- ▶ Each division $k = 1, 2$ investigates the profitability of a certain project, which can be either **success** ($\theta_k = 1$) or **failure** ($\theta_k = 0$)
 - ▶ θ_1 and θ_2 are not necessarily independent



Example


- ▶ At each instance of time, the company allocates a **unit of resources** between two divisions
- ▶ Each division k spends its resources $x_k \in [0, 1]$ to **search for a proof** that its project is successful $\theta_k = 1$

	$\theta_k = 1$	$\theta_k = 0$
Prob("good news")	$x_k dt$	0
Prob("no news")	$1 - x_k dt$	1



Example

- ▶ The company decides when to stop research and make the decision



Which project(s) to invest in (if any)?

General Framework

Learning Stage

- ▶ four states of the world:
 $(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in \{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 0)\}$
- ▶ two information sources:
 - ▶ source 1 = search for a proof that $\theta_1 = 1$
 - ▶ source 2 = search for a proof that $\theta_2 = 1$

Decision Making Stage

- ▶ $\mathcal{A} = \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$: set of alternatives to choose from
- ▶ $u_i(a)$: payoff from choosing alternative a

	(1, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
a_1	$u_1(a_1)$	$u_2(a_1)$	$u_3(a_1)$	$u_4(a_1)$
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots
a_n	$u_1(a_n)$	$u_2(a_n)$	$u_3(a_n)$	$u_4(a_n)$

General Framework

Learning Stage *How to learn?*

- ▶ four states of the world:
 $(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in \{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 0)\}$
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Decision Making Stage *Why to learn?*

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	(1, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
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Contribution


Optimal strategy balances the trade-off:

- ▶ *belief-based incentives*: use the source that leads to a higher $\text{Prob}(\text{"good news"})$
 - ▶ depends on current **beliefs**
- ▶ *payoff-based incentives*: learn about the project that leads to a higher profit if successful
 - ▶ depends on **payoff** matrix

Contribution

This paper shows


1. Optimal strategy has two phases: in the absence of “good news”



Contribution

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1. Optimal strategy has two phases: in the absence of “good news”




- ▶ phase 2 source depends on the *payoff matrix*
- ▶ thresholds depend on the *payoff matrix*

Contribution

This paper shows

1. Optimal strategy has two phases: in the absence of “good news”



- ▶ phase 2 source depends on the *payoff matrix*
- ▶ thresholds depend on the *payoff matrix*

2. Phase 1 rule introduces the notion is a source *index*


use the source with the highest **index**

Main Result


Expression for the index

Optimal Strategy: $\theta_1 + \theta_2 \leq 1$


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



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


Optimal Strategy: $\theta_1 + \theta_2 \leq 1$

Intuition



Optimal Strategy: General Case



Phase 1

Fix current beliefs (p_1, p_2, p_3) .

*If a positive signal occurs **now**, what is the optimal strategy?*

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Four possibilities:

1. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 2; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 1
2. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop ; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 1
3. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 2; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop
4. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop ; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop

Phase 1

Fix current beliefs (p_1, p_2, p_3) .

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Four possibilities:

1. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 2; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 1
▶ phase 1 rule: indifferent between both sources
2. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop ; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 1
3. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 2; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop
4. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop ; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop

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▶ phase 1 rule: use source 1
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▶ phase 1 rule: use source 1
3. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ learn from source 2; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop
▶ phase 1 rule: use source 2
4. $\theta_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop and choose a_1 ; $\theta_2 = 1 \Rightarrow$ stop and choose a_2
▶ phase 1 rule: use the source with the highest index


Theorem

Phase 1 rule: use the source with the highest index

$$p_k + p_3 u_3(a_k)$$

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


Theorem

Phase 1 rule: use the source with the highest index

source 1: p_1


source 2: p_2



Theorem

Phase 1 rule: use the source with the highest index

source 1: $p_1 + p_3 u_3(a_1)$ source 2: $p_2 + p_3 u_3(a_2)$



Discussion

Result

The index depends only on the **relative payoffs at state (1,1)**. In other words, its dependence on the **learning goal is very limited**

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Example with two investment projects:

- ▶ in monopoly market, only the **difference in payoffs in case of success** matters for the index

$$\underbrace{v_1}_{\text{payoff from successful project 1}} - \underbrace{v_2}_{\text{payoff from successful project 2}}$$

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- ▶ in monopoly market, only the **difference in payoffs in case of success** matters for the index

$$\underbrace{v_1}_{\text{payoff from successful project 1}} - \underbrace{v_2}_{\text{payoff from successful project 2}}$$

- ▶ when another firm can compete with the other project, only the payoffs when **both projects are successful** matter for the index

	(1, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
invest in project 1	v_1	0	$v_1 - d_1$	0
invest in project 2	0	v_2	$v_2 - d_2$	0

Discussion

Result

The index depends only on the **relative payoffs at state (1,1)**. In other words, its dependence on the **learning goal** is **very limited**

Examples:

information sources = different diagnostic tests;

decision problem also specifies possible treatments

*Why much do we need to know about possible treatments
to know which test to apply?*

Discussion

Result

The index depends only on the **relative payoffs at state (1,1)**. In other words, its dependence on the **learning goal** is **very limited**

Examples:

information sources = different diagnostic tests;

decision problem also specifies possible treatments

*Why much do we need to know about possible treatments
to know which test to apply?*

information sources = news topics in media;

decision problem also reflects individual characteristics,
such as policy preferences

*Why much do we need to know about individual characteristics
to know the demand for information sources?*

Literature

	Che&Mierendorff (2017, working paper)	Nikandrova&Pancs (2018, TE)	This paper
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states	(1,0) and (0,1)	(1,0), (0,1), (1,1), (0,0)	
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correlation	$\theta_1 + \theta_2 = 1$	$\theta_1 \perp \theta_2$	arbitrary
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alternatives	2 ("match the state")	2 ("choose successful project")	any number
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
focus	on a given decision problem ↓ optimal strategy (including chosen alternative)		on the general form of the learning process ↓ index
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Literature

Existing literature: alternatives and states are tightly connected

- ▶ Multi-armed bandit problem: alternatives \sim states (info about alternatives directly, not through a state of the world)
Pancs and Nikandrova 2018, Che and Mierendorff 2017, Klein and Rady 2011
- ▶ Search problem
 - ▶ minimize cost of learning conditional on finding the state
Ahlswede&Wegener 1987
 - ▶ or finding the state has a direct consequences to the payoff (treasure hunt)
Matros&Smirnov 2016, Fershtman&Rubinstein 1997
- ▶ *Liang, Mu, and Syrgkanis (2017)* came to the “opposite” conclusion that myopic learning is (almost) optimal
 - ▶ completely different structure of the decision problem; in particular, only one state component, θ_1 , is payoff relevant

Optimal Strategy



Reminder: $p_1 = \mathbb{P}[(1,0)]$, $p_2 = \mathbb{P}[(0,1)]$, $p_3 = \mathbb{P}[(1,1)]$, u_3 : payoff at (1,1)