Tatiana Mayskaya
I am an Assistant Professor in Economics at the International College of Economics and Finance and at the Faculty of Economic Sciences (Department of Theoretical Economics) in Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia
My page on HSE website
Research Interests: Information Economics, Economic Theory, Behavioral Economics
Contact: tmayskaya@gmail.com
Visit YouTube for my presentations
Publications
Two agents announce the state they consider most likely infinitely many times. A small departure from common belief in rationality can have a severe impact on the belief about the state and on the behavior of an extremist: while initial periods of disagreement produce a temporary convergence of beliefs, prolonged disagreement induces reversion towards the initial belief. The mechanism is simple: the longer the counterpart insists on the opposite view, the more the extremist doubts that the counterpart is intellectually capable and honest, and therefore the more he discounts the counterpart's opinion.
supersedes Disagreement Under Almost Common Knowledge of Rationality ICEF Working Paper WP9/2020/01 All versions
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 144, March 2024, Pages 29-48 SSRN doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.001 Presentation video (30 min) Slides
A rational principal delegates learning to an overconfident agent who overestimates the precision of the information he collects. The principal chooses between two contracts: commitment, in which the agent commits to the duration of learning in advance, and flexible, in which the agent decides when to stop learning in real time. When the agent is sufficiently overconfident, the principal optimally ties the agent's hands by offering him the commitment contract. When the principal can choose both the contract and the agent's level of overconfidence, selecting the rational agent is suboptimal when the cost of learning is sufficiently high.
European Economic Review, Vol. 162, February 2024, Article 104653 SSRN doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104653 Presentation video (35 min) Slides
An agent learns in continuous time from two information sources, each associated with a hypothesis. If a hypothesis is true, the associated source confirms it at a positive rate. False hypotheses are never confirmed. Among the two hypotheses, either exactly one is true or both are false. The agent’s optimal learning strategy has two phases. During the first phase, the agent follows his beliefs; that is, at each moment, he learns from the source associated with the most likely hypothesis according to his current beliefs. During the second phase, he focuses on excluding the least likely but more important hypothesis.
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 212, September 2023, Article 105699 SSRN doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699 Presentation video (25 min) Slides Supplementary material
A hider publicly commits to the number of seekers and then privately gets involved in a story, which may be compromising. Each seeker aims to be the first to learn and report a compromising story. The seekers learn the story privately and in continuous time. With more seekers, the hider's story gets revealed at a faster rate, but each seeker gets discouraged and ceases learning more quickly. To reduce the probability of a compromising report, the hider may optimally choose infinitely many seekers. Nevertheless, the hider unambiguously benefits from making it harder for each seeker to learn her story.
Working Papers
We study how a reduction in communication cost affects equilibrium diversity (in expertise) in hiring decisions. The key trade-off is that, while hiring a more diverse team may enlarge the team's pool of knowledge, it also makes communication between the hired experts more challenging. Equilibrium diversity balances this trade-off. We find that equilibrium diversity may exhibit a U-shape relationship with communication cost, reaching its lowest point at moderate cost values, where experts' incentives to communicate are most sensitive to changes in diversity.
(last version: July 26, 2023) Presentation video (30 min) Slides CEPR Discussion Paper 17947 All versions
A merger of two companies active in seemingly unrelated markets creates data linkage: by operating in a product market, the merged company acquires an informational advantage in an insurance market where companies compete in menus of contracts. In the insurance market, the informed insurer earns rent through cream-skimming. Some of this rent is passed on to consumers in the product market. Overall, the data linkage makes consumers better off when the insurance market is competitive and, under some conditions, even when the insurance market is monopolistic. The role of competitiveness of the product market and the data-sharing requirement are discussed.
We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model in which there is uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects on innovation. Once an innovation has already taken place, the merger may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect). At the same time, the merger may increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect) and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). A surprising policy implication of our model is that the benefit of the merger may be higher if the first and subsequent innovations are closer substitutes.
We investigate how optimal cognitive diversity depends on the nature of production and the objective employed. When the output of the most productive worker becomes relatively more important, with a utilitarian objective, optimal diversity weakly increases. However, with a Rawlsian objective, which captures the preferences of a public service provider, a regulated firm, or a very risk averse manager, optimal diversity might decrease. Moreover, optimal diversity is weakly higher with the Rawlsian objective than with the utilitarian one, which suggests that high diversity in teams can be achieved by imposing a minimal satisfactory service requirement rather than micromanaging diversity directly.
A Sender must disclose a string of privately observed signals to a receiver with listening costs. The Sender can choose the order of the signals. We show that a strategy of alternating between favourable and unfavourable signals can dominate a strategy of ``front-loading" favourable signals.
Work in Progress
The Effect of Mergers on Innovation: Insights from a Two-Avenue Model joint with Kaustav Das and Arina Nikandrova
Presentations by me or a coauthor
16 October 2024
RIEM-ICEF 2024 Joint Workshop (Research Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovation slides
9 October 2024
Compass Lexecon consulting firm (online)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
27 September 2024
ITAM (Mexico)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
10 September 2024
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Seminar (London, UK)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
1 September 2024
European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE 2024) (University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Claudia Herresthal
29 August 2024
The 76th European meeting of the Econometric Society (ESEM, within EEA-ESEM Congress) (Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam, Netherlands)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Claudia Herresthal
19 August 2024
The 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES 2024) (Peking University, Beijing, China)
The Effect of State Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on R&D slides
9 July 2024
The 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (CMID 2024) (Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
5 July 2024
The 18th International Conference on Competition and Regulation (CRESSE 2024 Conference) (Chania, Crete)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
17 June 2024
Workshop on Economics of Science and Innovation, BSE Summer Forum (Barcelona, Spain)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovation slides
10 June 2024
The 2024 International Conference on Public Economic Theory (PET 2024) (Lyon, France)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
31 May 2024
The 3rd ICEF-FES-NES Workshop in Microeconomic Theory (HSE University, Moscow)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
28 May 2024
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
5 May 2024
The 22nd Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC 2024) (Boston, MA, US)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
4 May 2024
The 22nd Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC 2024) (Boston, MA, US)
Diversity in Teams slides
presented by Vladimir Smirnov
18 March 2024
University of Essex, UK
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
9 February 2024
The 41st Australasian Economic Theory Workshop (AETW2024) (University of Melbourne, Australia)
Diversity in Teams slides
presented by Vladimir Smirnov
11 January 2024
The 2023 International Conference on Public Economic Theory (PET 2023) (Santiago, Chile)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
9 January 2024
The 23rd Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Santiago, Chile)
The Effect of State Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on R&D slides
16 December 2023
Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Conference (APIOC) 2023 (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
Diversity in Teams slides
presented by Andrew Wait
4 December 2023
Game Theory Seminar, University of Graz, Austria
Ordering Data to Persuade
presented by Steven Kivinen
1 December 2023
Second Workshop in Information Economics (HSE University, Moscow)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
23 November 2023
University of Warwick, UK
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
20 November 2023
The 93rd Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association — SEA conference, session 3.A.03 Theory: Information V (New Orleans, LA, US)
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
presented by Miaomiao Dong
8 November 2023
New Zealand Microeconomics Study Group Meeting (University of Otago, New Zealand)
Diversity in Teams slides
presented by Vladimir Smirnov
8 November 2023
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) lunch workshop (Germany)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Claudia Herresthal
8 November 2023
Specialist Seminar at the University of Edinburgh, UK
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
7 November 2023
Microtheory Seminar Series at Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
7 November 2023
CMA Durham Workshop (Durham University Business School, UK)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
3 November 2023
The 9th Lancaster Game Theory Conference (Lancaster University, UK)
Diversity in Teams slides
1 November 2023
University of Leicester Business School, UK
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
31 October 2023
University of London, City, UK
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
20 October 2023
The 12th CRC Retreat – Bonn-Mannheim Workshop (Germany)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Claudia Herresthal
20 September 2023
International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making, HSE University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
13 September 2023
Pennsylvania State University, PA, US
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
11 September 2023
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, US
The Effect of Mergers on Innovations slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
8 September 2023
Social and Political Economy Conference Series: Data, Markets, and Privacy (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, US)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
18 July 2023
The 22nd Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Paris, France)
Knowledge Transfers slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
17 July 2023
The 22nd Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Paris, France)
Diversity in Teams slides
6 July 2023
Centre for Research in Behavioural Science (CRIBS) Workshop (University of Nottingham, UK)
The Effect of Mergers on Innovation slides
presented by Kaustav Das
20 June 2023
The Effect of Mergers on Innovation slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
9 June 2023
Workshop on Competition and Regulation in Digital Markets (UL City, UK)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
1 June 2023
Second FES-ICEF-NES Workshop in Microeconomic Theory (HSE University, Moscow)
Diversity in Teams slides
14 April 2023
XXIV Yasin (April) International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development (HSE University, Moscow)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
6 December 2022
Second Workshop on Contracts, Incentives and Information (CEPR event; Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy)
Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
5 December 2022
NES30 Academic Conference in Memory of Gur Ofer (online)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
4 November 2022
The 8th Lancaster Game Theory Conference (Lancaster University, UK)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
21 October 2022
Workshop in Information Economics in Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? slides
16 July 2022
The 21th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, Online)
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity? slides
16 July 2022
The 21th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, Online)
The Effect of Data-Driven Mergers on Insurance Markets slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
10 June 2022
Conference in Birkbeck, University of London
The Effect of Data-Driven Mergers on Insurance Markets slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
8 June 2022
Economic Theory Workshop (City, University of London)
The Dark Side of Transparency: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
18 May 2022
Micro Theory Workshop (HSE Moscow, Online)
The Effect of Data-Driven Mergers on Insurance Markets slides
8 April 2022
Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (PETCO) (PennState University, PA, US)
Diversity and Communication slides
presented by Miaomiao Dong
28 March 2022
Digital Economy Network Workshop (University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, Online)
The Effect of Data-Driven Mergers on Insurance Markets slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
23 February 2022
PennState Theory Workshop
Diversity and Communication slides
presented by Miaomiao Dong
4 December 2021
The 8th Annual Economic Theory Conference (Arizona State University, AZ, US)
Diversity and Communication slides
presented by Miaomiao Dong
27 October 2021
City, University of London
Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
14 October 2021
ICEF-FES-NES Micro Theory Workshop in Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning slides
1 September 2021
Learning, Evolution and Games Conference (LEG) (Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works slides
22 July 2021
The 6th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES) (Budapest, Hungary, Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works slides
30 June 2021
WEAI Virtual 96th Annual Conference
Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment slides
13 June 2021
The 20th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Seoul, South Korea, Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works slides
3 June 2021
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
9 February 2021
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
23 December 2020
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Online)
Diversity and Communication slides
15 October 2020
City, University of London (Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
presented by Arina Nikandrova
August 2020
The 12th World Congress of the Econometric Society (Bocconi University, Online)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
25 November 2019
The 89th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association (Fort Lauderdale, FL, US)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
22 November 2019
ITAM (Mexico)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
31 October 2019
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Disagreement Under Almost Common Knowledge of Rationality slides
presented by Emiliano Catonini
31 October 2019
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work? slides
17 July 2019
The 30th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook University, NY, US)
When Should We Care About Privacy? slides
1 July 2019
The 19th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Ischia, Italy)
Disagreement Under Almost Common Knowledge of Rationality slides
4 April 2019
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
When Should We Care About Privacy? Information Collection in Games slides
13 December 2018
NRU Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg)
Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment slides
5 December 2018
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Endogenous Choice Between Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Experimental Evidence slides
19 November 2018
The 88th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association (Washington, DC, US)
Endogenous Choice Between Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Experimental Evidence slides
2 November 2018
The 4th Lancaster Game Theory Conference (Lancaster University, UK)
Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks slides
1 November 2018
Birkbeck, University of London
Endogenous Choice Between Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Experimental Evidence slides
27 October 2018
The 10th Lisbon Meeting in Game Theory and Applications (Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Portugal)
Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks slides
27 August 2018
European Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Cologne, Germany)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
18 July 2018
The 29th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook University, NY, US)
Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks slides
21 June 2018
North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (UC Davis, CA, US)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
12 June 2018
The 18th Annual Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference (Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan)
Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment slides
31 May 2018
Toulouse School of Economics
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
18 November 2017
The 3rd Lancaster Game Theory Conference (Lancaster University, UK)
Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment slides
13 November 2017
Cambridge University
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
9 November 2017
University of Warwick
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
7 November 2017
Oxford University (Nuffield College)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
20 July 2017
The 28th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook University, NY, US)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
24 February 2017
Carnegie Mellon University (Tepper School of Business)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
22 December 2016
NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
Dynamic Choice of Information Sources slides
4 March 2016
The 18th Southwest Economic Theory (SWET) Conference (UC Riverside, CA, US)
Selective Exposure to Information slides